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Abstract / Resumo 
Africa has been the neglected continent in world politics. It has also been the subject of 
aid dependency and policy conditionality, leaving little autonomy of decision-making 
and ownership of its development policies. The recent economic turn-around and the 
global rush for resources and commodities have raised the importance of the African 
continent in the international economic scene. Many African countries are rich in 
resources and they have seen their development possibilities enhanced by intensified 
economic relations in particular with the emerging economies but also with their 
traditional main partners. However, as this is happening at the country level and African 
countries still have disperse voices in their exchanges with the rest of the world, the 
possibilities for leveraging this new potential are limited. Through the analysis of the 
dynamics of regional integration in Africa, this paper explores the hypothesis that 
increased integration would give a stronger voice, policy space and ultimately 
ownership of policies to African countries.   
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INTRODUCTION  
Africa, like other continents is not a homogenous unit. However, most of the countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa share a historical evolution marked by low or very low rates of 
economic development and growth, as well as a relative marginalization in world 
politics. Since their independence as modern states, African countries soon became 
entangled in the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War. Proxy wars raged across the 
continent, while at the international level Western countries were constructing a global 
polity.  
The Non-Aligned Movement and the G77 were early efforts at autonomisation from 
those dynamics but remained influenced by the ideological cleavages between 
capitalism and communism, as the newly independent countries tried to uphold their 
specific interests and concerns in the international arena. In political terms, a highly 
fragmented continent, plagued by conflict had difficulty in ascertaining itself and its 
interests in an international arena where institutions were mushrooming to respond to 
the interests of the developed countries. In economic terms, the dependency on aid that 
most Sub-Saharan Africa experienced left it limited not only in terms of the possibility 
of influencing world politics but, most strikingly, of deciding on its own domestic 
policies. Structural adjustment and aid conditionality during the 1980s essentially took 
over the political economy of most African countries. 
The contemporary international political scene offers a number of potential windows of 
opportunity for changes in this status quo (Bayne e Woolcock, 2011). The club of 
industrialised countries, G8, was paralleled by the G20 that has a broader geographical 
representation;  emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
among others) have increasing weight in the global economy and influence in world 
politics; and this is particularly felt in their increasing thirst for natural resources to feed 
high levels of production and growing consumer markets. Although the exact impacts of 
the global economic crisis and of emerging economies are not yet known, they are 
bound to have broad implications at the global level and in the balances of influence in 
world politics. Among such implications is a window that African countries may take to 
consolidate changes that respond to their specific concerns at the international level and 
make their preferences noted and decisive in international negotiations. The importance 
of Africa being more active in  influencing  world politics is not only linked to the 
possibility of the continent taking advantages of opportunities to resolutely move 
towards sustainable development, but also to protect their interests from the negative 
implications of global transformations, not least in the area of the environment and 
climate change. 
Africa´s natural resources  are essential to sustain current growth levels and the 
continent  also represents a potential new regional consumer market. Both of these 
aspects can have positive impacts but also very negative ones, depending on how they 
are addressed. Africa is also increasingly “getting its act together” and strengthening 
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regional and sub-regional institutions that are crucial to better manage common 
interests. The African Union is the primary institution, but other sub-regional 
institutions, such as SADC, ECOWAS, COMESA among others, are trying to respond 
to regional needs, specificities, markets, cultures, political and social contexts. 
It is against this broad frame of opportunity but also of uncertainty that the present 
paper proposes to analyse the political opportunities and limitations for Africa to take 
advantage of this potential and to have more influence in the world politics and 
economics and more ownership of its policies. Through secondary literature and 
document analysis, we will review the external relations of Africa, namely existing fora 
for policy coordination among African countries and the relation between states and 
regional organizations in such processes. The focus will be on the implications for Sub-
Saharan Africa, since North Africa has a distinct and specific historical evolution. 
An essential theoretical issue to explore further is what the conditions are for increased 
leverage in world politics and economics, in a context of change in the traditional 
structural limitations that Africa faces. Here we explore the issue of agency and how the 
possibility of increased policy coordination and a higher degree of policy integration 
may enhance the potential of African countries for speaking in one voice and obtaining 
more policy-space and ownership of their international and domestic policies. We will 
start by addressing the limitations and possibilities of these two concepts, policy space 
and ownership, and how research on regional integration shows the potential for 
additional influence in the international playing field of participating countries and of 
joint policy positions. We will then analyse the institutional framework of the African 
Union and the dynamics of regional economic integration, namely how the external 
trade ties impact on regional economic integration and vice-versa, and how Africa has 
shown to be ale to  exert leverage at the multilateral level, exploring the examples of the 
EPA negotiations and the aid effectiveness agenda. 
 
 
LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES ON AFRICAN POLICY-SPACE AND OWNERSHIP 
The development aid agenda has evolved over the years in highly unsatisfactory ways 
(Mosley, 1991; Easterly, 2006; Glennie, 2008). Although the specific reasons found for 
the successive policy failures are many, there is a consensus that international aid has 
not been able to outweigh the negative effects of a system dominated by neo-liberal 
development models, with serious impacts on developing countries (Mosse e Lewis, 
2005; Craig e Porter, 2006; Sumner, 2006). Neo-Liberal model critics and supporters 
see two different sides of the coin: supporters claim inadequate implementation of the 
prescribed policies while critics blame the very essence of a model that entails global 
inequity. 
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What is most problematic is the disjuncture between the economic growth agenda and 
the social policy agenda. The economic growth agenda is dominated by the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) and the trade negotiations. These have imposed reforms 
limiting the policy space available for countries to decide policies that protect the 
vulnerable sectors of their economies. The social agenda, in the form of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and increasingly the focus of poverty reduction, is meant 
to offset the consequences of low economic performance on the increasingly 
impoverished populations. It is also meant to advance the social agenda in governments 
that are very often not democratically accountable and suffering serious problems in 
good governance. Therefore, new modalities of conditionality are being imposed that, 
rather insist on good governance policies more than in the classical structural 
adjustment conditions (Rakner e Wang, 2007; Booth e Fritz, 2008; Carmody, 2008). 
 
 
Policy space and ownership 
There is very little reference to policy space in the academic literature on political 
science. Existing empirical analyses focus on the space generated by the differences 
between and within parties in the political spectrum (Pennings, 2002). The other 
references are found in the literature on the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
negotiations framework since this is a term that was used explicitly to specify the loss of 
government autonomy generated by the international trade agreements.   
The concept of policy space thus arises out of the constraints on freedom of choice 
derived from international agreements that increasingly regulate trade relations in a 
globalised world. According to the São Paulo consensus (UNCTAD, 2004): “It is for 
each Government to evaluate the trade-off between the benefits of accepting 
international rules and commitments and the constraints posed by the loss of policy 
space. It is particularly important for developing countries, bearing in mind 
development goals and objectives, that all countries take into account the need for 
appropriate balance between national policy space and international disciplines and 
commitments.”  
Policy space ultimately equals the possibility of introducing protectionist policies aimed 
at nurturing national  industries, contrary to existing international arrangements, and to 
streamline conditionalities of the IFIs. The relevance and legitimacy of these 
protectionist practices was enhanced with the economic crisis of 2008 (see, G77 and 
China, 2010). Another concept has been associated with this approach to policy space, 
that is “development space”, illustrating the link between domestic policies and 
conditionality, but not necessarily reflecting negotiation space in international 
agreements in general (Hoekman, 2005).  
There is a general concurrence that developing countries’ policy space is shrinking 
(Wade, 2003), although Page (2007) argues that such space has been lost and gained. 
     WP 112 / 2012 
 
Mais Working Papers CEsA disponíveis em 
http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~cesa/index.php/menupublicacoes/working-papers  6 
The discussion on policy space in the context of trade negotiations starts in Monterrey’s 
conference on Financing for Development in 2002, where the negative impacts of 
globalization were acknowledged. From there emerged two parallel but often decoupled 
concepts on enhancing the capacity of autonomous policy-making of developing 
countries: the policy space concept in the WTO context, and the ownership concept in 
the context of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005.   
In this paper we take a different view on policy space, not directed at the internal level 
but at the external or multilateral level. In this context policy space would entail the 
amount of influence African countries are able to have on international negotiations. 
This would be best assessed in circumstances where significant contrasting policy 
positions are at stake, of which this article will explore some examples, but it may also 
be reflected in instances of more subtle influence in the international policy agenda. 
As suggested above, policy space is closely related with the principle of ownership of 
development policies as defined by the Paris Declaration and the subsequent Accra 
Agenda for Action of 2008. However, in the latter concept, the relational dimension is 
more obvious as it states that developing countries should have the leadership over their 
development policies, implying that other actors such as donors also have a say in those 
policies. In practice, ownership reflects more directly the negotiative interaction 
between developed and developing countries than the policy space concept, which 
refers to the trade-off of domestic gains and limitations from countries’ commitments in 
international trade regulations. 
In an alternative definition of ownership that is more in tune with the object of this 
research and links the two concepts, we would emphasise the capacity of countries to 
make use of policy space in influencing policy decisions towards policy priorities. This 
definition of ownership presupposes that there is an a priori identification of policy 
priorities and the legitimacy and credibility to uphold them. 
The link between the two concepts is illustrated in the G77 statement to the United 
Nations General Assembly on the occasion of the UN Conference on the World 
Financial and Economic Crisis and its impact on Development in 2010: “The G77 and 
China deems important to strengthen the concepts of ownership and policy space. In 
that respect, it must be borne in mind that client countries are the owners of their 
development policies and that selectivity in World Bank's strategy and actions must be 
guided, first and foremost by developing countries' priorities and preferences.” (G77 
and China, 2010) 
Policy space is also related but distinct from voice: voice is possibility of stating a 
position and is close to participation, but doesn’t mean actual influence in the policy 
outcome as reflected in the following G77 statements: “The G77 and China believes 
that decision-making rules should be changed in order to strengthen voice and 
participation of developing countries.”  And “The G77  and China calls for an 
expeditious completion, as soon as possible, of a much more ambitious reform process 
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of the World Bank's governance structure and of an accelerated road map for further 
reforms on voice, participation and enhanced voting power of developing countries 
based on an approach that truly reflects its development mandate and with the 
involvement of all shareholders in an equitable, transparent, consultative and inclusive 
process.” (G77 and China, 2010)  
In this context one can argue that policy articulation and coordination between countries 
may in certain circumstances give more policy space and ownership. Much of this also 
depends on the salience of issue-areas and on the degree of consensus on a policy 
position. Consensus documents publicised as outcomes of conferences may be powerful 
tools to express the weight of the position. For instance, the Kigali consensus was an 
important instrument leading to the elimination of three areas of further intervention in 
internal affairs in the context not only of the Uruguay Round negotiations but of the 
WTO itself (Third World Network, 2004).  
In the same manner, fragmentation  and different negotiating strategies can also lead to 
failure of coalitions (Narlikar e Odell, 2003). There are instances of coalition failures by 
defection of some members, depending on the “carrots” offered at the bilateral level. In 
these cases, developed countries use a strategy of undermining the coalition by offering 
incentives for defection in bilateral talks. This is one of the reasons pointed out for the 
interest in maintaining a multilateral negotiating framework rather than a bilateral one 
for trade negotiations, thus enabling coalitions to form and resist developed countries’ 
pressures (Narlikar e Wilkinson, 2004). 
Regional integration favours policy articulation and coordination, thus in theory 
enhancing the influence of its members and of the group as a whole and shielding the 
group against external pressures.  
 
 
Regional integration as promoter of power to its members  
Existing models of regional integration reflect different types and degrees of policy 
convergence. The most developed of these is the EU model, but also the Mercosur, 
NAFTA and ASEAN constitute some of the many examples in different quarters of the 
world (Mattli, 1999). 
Neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism provide explanations of how integration 
evolves but they both focus predominantly on the internal dynamics rather than on the 
external dimensions of integration. Internal dimensions are important in explaining 
coordination and avoiding free-riding, a problem that affects loose coordination 
structures more evidently. Mattli (1999) also examines the logic of integration beyond 
Europe arguing that many of the integration schemes in Latin America and Asia are 
examples of second integrative response to potential trade diversion. Africa, to a lesser 
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extent can also be seen as such, although the process has been too complex and 
externally influenced to enable such a straightforward argument. 
Although the implementation capacity of states participating in regional integration 
processes has not matched the rhetoric, and existing cases have disappointed 
expectations of being an intermediate step to global governance (Malamud e Castro, 
2007), regionalism can be advantageous for example in reducing transaction costs. 
Leadership is pointed out as crucial to the success of such forms of political interaction 
(Mattli, 1999). This leadership may be exerted by delegation to central institutions in 
more advanced forms of integration or by political leaders of some of the participating 
states, depending on the nature of the issue. Meunier (2005) explores the detrimental 
effects of cacophony and disparate positions at the EU level and this argument can be 
applied to other instances. 
Some studies have analysed the degree of EU “actorness” in different contexts and how 
it enhances its bargaining power (Groenleer e Van Schaik, 2007) but it is still difficult 
to assess the effects of speaking in one voice (Smith, 2010). Even when the EU does 
speak in one voice, its negotiation arrangements are often organized in an ad hoc way 
and marked by internal differences (Delreux, 2008).  
The idea of policy coordination and group cohesion is not automatically beneficial, as 
was shown in the case of the Group of Like-Minded states where most defected from 
the group position due to parallel bilateral incentives from developed countries, and 
those who remained loyal lost credit. Much depends on the type of negotiation 
strategies adopted by the group: Narlikar and Odell (2003) distinguish between 
integrative strategies and distributive strategies, claiming that the former have better 
chances of keeping the group together (see also Narlikar e Tussie, 2004). 
UNCTAD itself advocated for greater regional integration in Africa as way to enhance 
policy space (UNCTAD, 2007). However, regional agreements on trade may also 
reduce policy space (Page, 2007), and it may be relevant to say that there is a need to 
articulate strategically the impacts of regional agreements to the impact of agreements at 
the multilateral level (Mayer, 2009). 
 
 
The Challenges of African Regional Integration: from the OAU to AU 
The Organization of African Unity (OAU) created in 1963 responded to the aspirations 
and collective efforts of the African leadership for an institutional body sustaining the 
continent´s political and economic integration. The OAU was expected to become the 
forum for African leaders to come together and discuss and solve the continent´s 
ongoing issues. Its main goals were the rapid decolonization of the continent, its unity 
and the defence of the territorial integrity of the member states (Akokpari, 2004).  
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OAU played an important role in helping African states achieve political independence. 
Yet, economic independence and political stability was far more difficult to obtain. The 
Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) agreed in 1980 and based on the principle of “collective 
self-reliance” was an attempt to transform the economic structure of Africa and to help 
the continent overcome its economic crisis (Adogamhe, 2008). As Paul Adogamhe 
points out:“the LPA diagnosed that Africa´s economic crisis was caused by the 
historical injustice suffered by Africa under colonialism and its continued dependence 
on external forces (p.12).” 
The LPA aimed at pushing for Africa´s self-sufficient and self-sustained development 
through industrialization and continental integration schemes. It was the policy response 
by African leaders to diminish foreign economic dependency and fortify their collective 
capacity to bargain with world economic powers. This was followed by the Abuja 
Treaty in 1991 that provided the institutional framework necessary for the gradual 
establishment of the African Economic Community (AEC). This framework was 
conceived to ultimately lead to the free movement of people and goods across the 
continent. The initial implementation of the Abuja Treaty involvedthe experimentation 
with a diversity of regional economic communities that were later expected to become 
the “building blocks” of the AEC (Adogamhe, 2008). However, since their creation, 
these regional economic communities, by operating independently from each other, 
have failed to fulfil the expectations as building blocks of AEC. 
Africa is now hosting several regional economic communities such as:   
1) the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (known by its French 
acronym, CEMAC) that includes Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Republic of Congo – ROC, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon; 
2) the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), with 
Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo –DROC – Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe; 
3) the East African Community (EAC) with Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania 
and Uganda; 
4) the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d´Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo; 
5) the West African Economic and Monetary Union (known by its French 
acronym, UEMOA) with Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d´Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo; 
6) the Southern African Development Community (SADC), with Angola, 
Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo – DROC – Lesotho, Madagascar, 
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Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe; 
While regional economic integration was not delivering the original pursuit of self-
reliant development, African countries also experienced several civil wars that not only 
played a destructive role in the economy but also brought a serious and disruptive 
political instability to the continent.   
This context had a profound impact on the identity of the OAU by revealing its 
incapacity to prevent and address these conflicts. It raised the point that the 
organisation´s institutional flaws were making it no longer viable. Almost four decades 
after its creation, the OAU institutions were unprepared to deal with conflicts among 
members, impotent in dealing with globalisation and the economic marginalisation of 
the continent, unable to deepen economic integration as the continent´s economic crisis 
got worse and weak in fighting widespread violations of basic civil and political rights 
(Akokpari, 2002, Adogamhe, 2008). 
It was against this background that the African leaders decided to dissolve the OAU and 
formally create a new organization - the African Union (AU) - in 2002. The expectation 
was that the new institutional framework would be able to address the major issues 
affecting the continent´s, security stability, political progress and socioeconomic 
development.  Despite the continued emphasis on the respect for territorial integrity of 
member states, a clear constitutional difference between the OAU and AU has lied in 
the right of the latter to intervene in a member state in order to “restore peace and 
stability” to prevent genocides, war crimes and crimes against humanity (Adogamhe, 
2008) 
In 2003, African leaders decide to integrate NEPAD, the New Partnership for African 
Development, in the AU. NEPAD was a new economic initiative launched in 2001 and 
heralded as the blueprint for full-scale socioeconomic development of the continent. As 
with the Lagos Plan of Action, NEPAD was the policy response by African leaders to 
deal with globalisation, trade and aid for economic development. It set a new format of 
engagement with the developed world and with multilateral organisations, based on 
mutual respect, good governance, responsibility and accountability. Additionally, an 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was also established to guarantee that 
African leaders would be accountable to each other for the effective implementation of 
political and economic reforms (Adogamhe, 2008). 
Ten years later, it is still difficult to assess the real impact of AU, NEPAD and APRM 
in terms of deepening regional integration. NEPAD, for example, has been criticised for 
embracing the failed economic policies and programs of the World Bank/IMF and 
falling short of ending the continent´s marginalisation and of structurally transforming 
the African political economies (Adésínà, 2001, Amuwo, 2002). 
In the past decade, Africa has seen marked improvements in human development. 
African countries have undertaken market-oriented reforms and key economic 
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fundamentals have improved considerably: annual average growth closed to 5 per cent 
(1998-2008), improved trade revenues, reduced macroeconomic imbalances, stronger 
demand for domestic services (Ali & Dadush, 2011). 
This is more the result of faster integration of Africa with the rest of the world than with 
itself.  Economic growth in the region is above all the result of strong exports of the 
continent´s commodities, which are needed by fast-growing economies such as India 
and China. But this has had limited impact on the economy at large and in social 
policies, with the continent continuing to reveal high levels of poverty and inequalities 
(Brenton and Isik, 2012). According to official custom statistics, Africa continues to 
trade little with itself and failing to achieve its potential in regional trade. As an 
example, the share of intra-regional goods trade in total goods imports is only around 
five percent in COMESA, 10 percent in ECOWAS and eight percent in UEMOA 
(Brenton and Isik, 2012). 
As Paul Brenton and Gozde Isik (2012) point out:  
“Regional trade can bring staple foods from areas of surplus production across borders 
to growing urban markets and food deficit rural areas. With rising incomes in Africa 
there are emerging opportunities for cross-border trade in basic manufactures such as 
metal and plastic products that are costly to import from the global market. The 
potential for regional production chains to drive global exports of manufacturers, such 
as those in East Asia, has yet to be exploited, and cross border trade in services offers 
untapped opportunities for exports and better access to consumers and firms to services 
that are cheaper and provide a variety than those currently available.” (p.1). 
In this sense, regional integration can be regarded as an engine that can accelerate 
economic growth and sustainable development in Africa. Yet, regional integration in 
Africa is progressing slowly due to the lack of financial resources and expertise, 
multiple and overlapping memberships in sub-regional organisations, weak co-
ordination, harmonisation and implementation of commonly agreed protocols and 
decisions in the continent and poor regional infra-structure (African Economic Outlook, 
2012).   
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External Partners and Enhanced African Regional Integration 
Africa´s traditional partners, the European Union and the United States, as well as a 
more recent one, China, can support regional economic integration by keeping with 
their commitments to assist Africa´s economic development and through the provision 




Since 2000, trade ties between the U.S. and Africa have been under Washington´s 
African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA, www.agoa.gov). This trade initiative 
has opened U.S. markets to almost all goods produced in AGOA-eligible countries and 
it has contributed to increase the volume and diversity of trade between U.S. and Sub-
Saharan Africa.
1
  In 2011, U.S. total exports to Sub-Saharan Africa totalled US$21 
billion, an increase of almost 23% in comparison with the previous year. Machinery, 
mineral fuels, cereals and aircraft drove the growth of U.S. exports to Africa. Sub-
Saharan exports to the US reached US$74.2 billion, up 14% from 2010.  Mineral fuels, 
precious metals and stones, vehicles and cocoa products led the African products sold to 
the US. Under AGOA, African exports to the US totalled US$51.8 billion, 34% more 
than 2010. Mineral fuels and crude oil represented 94% of the African exports (US$48.4 
billion). AGOA´s African exports of non-energy products grew 26% and they were led 
by vehicles, iron and steel and apparel (woven and knit) (US Department of Commerce, 
2012). The annual U.S. Sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Economic Forum is one of the 
main formal gatherings within the AGOA framework. It is informally known as “The 
AGOA Forum” serves to institutionalise high-level dialogue between U.S. officials and 
their counterparts in AGOA-eligible countries. This is expected to build closer 




EU is Africa´s main trade partner and it has offered it trade preferences through such 
schemes as the Everything But Arms and it is now seeking to conclude EPAS - 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The strength of EU-Africa relations go 
beyond trade and fall under the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership (2007) addressing 
political, economic and social issues. In 2010 (last available data), E.U total exports to 
Sub-Saharan Africa reached around US$124 billion, up almost 16% from the previous 
                                                             
1 AGOA beneficiaries: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, 
Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome 
and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia. 
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year. Machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods and chemicals 
representing 68% of the goods exported by Europe to Africa. E.U total imports from 
Sub-Saharan Africa grew to almost US$132 billion, 22% higher than 2009. Mineral 





China has made clear its commitments towards Africa since the 2006 Forum on China-
Africa Co-operation (FOCAC, www.focac.org/eng/). This Forum was set up in 2000 as 
“a platform established by China and friendly African countries for collective 
consultation and dialogue and a cooperation mechanism between the developing 
countries, which falls into the category of South-South cooperation”.
2
 It is through 
FOCAC that China implements its trade policy towards Africa. FOCAC makes clear 
that China’s ties with Africa are focused on building a strong economic cooperation 
through financial support and bilateral trade. As China increases its financing to the 
Africa and an increasing number of Chinese state-owned and private firms enter the 
African market,  trade between China and the continent has grown from US$4.1 billion 
in 1992 to around US$160 billion in 2011 (Freemantle & Stevens, 2012). Africa´s rich 
resources have become increasingly important to help China´s rapid economic growth 
and development. As a result nearly 80% of China´s imports from Africa comprise 
mineral fuels and oils.  Thus, Africa´s exports to China totalled US$93 billion in 2011 
from less than US$1 billion in 1992 (Freemantle & Stevens, 2012). Africa´s imports 
from China have increased from US$3.02 billion in 1992 to US$73 billion in 2011 
(Freemantle & Stevens, 2012). Twelve years after the first FOCAC in Beijing, China 
has now become one of the leading trade partners of Africa. 
 
 
External Partners and Threats to Policy Space and Ownership 
There are, however, concerns that old and new trade partners, namely the European 
Union, United States and China can negatively affect steps for stronger regional 
integration due to bilateral trade deals. As African regional groups seek to adopt 
customs unions with common external tariffs, trade agreements on the African side will 
only bring a positive impact if they are concluded on a regional basis rather than 
bilaterally. This, however, seems not to be happening in the case of negotiations 
between EU and Africa. For the past decade, trade negotiations between the two 
economic blocs were supposed to be undertaken within the framework of regional 
groups to enhance integration. Instead, the negotiations have been dominated by 
                                                             
2 See http://www.focac.org/eng/, accessed 20/05/2012 
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bilateral agreements. This same seems to apply to the case of China. (African Economic 
Outlook, 2011) 
With the changing global economics dynamics and a competition for African 
commodities and resources between the EU, US, China, India and Brazil and other 
emerging economies, Africa has the opportunity to assert itself to gain more policy 
space and ownership over the terms of the continent´s sustainable development.  Better 
coordination among African states within the current regional integration framework 
can strengthen the continent´s bargaining power in the negotiating table.  This approach 
can maximise the potential benefits it can obtain from engagement with these trade 
partners and positively shape the patterns of foreign direct investment across the 
continent towards enhancing productive activities, upgrading worker´s skills, 
technology transfer, better infrastructure and high-valued agricultural development.  
 
 
EPAs and Busan: Africa Fight for Policy Space and Ownership 
EPAs are new trade agreements being negotiated between the EU and the ACP 
(African, Caribbean and Pacific) group of developing countries to replace the former 
Cotonou Agreement.  With the EPAs, the EU wants the ACP countries to open their 
doors to European goods and services in return for duty-free market to European 
consumer and commodities market. The negotiations started in 2002 and were expected 
to conclude in 2007. Instead, throughout 2011 progress continued to be limited and 
none of the African regional communities has fully implemented an EPA. 
African leaders argue that EPAs will destroy their nascent industries and hamper the 
needed structural transformation of the economy by allowing the entrance of European 
goods and services. In September 2011, the European Commission announced that it 
intended to remove trade preferences by January 2014 in case of countries failed to 
ratify and implement their respective EPAs (Ramdoo & Bilal, 2011). In an EPA 
Negotiations Coordination Meeting organised by the African Union in Arusha 




of May, 2012 to review and assess the current state 
of the negotiations, the African Union’s response was clear. Despite the European 
Commission´s announced plans, the meeting adopted the following recommendations 
among others:  
“ix. There is need for a rethink of EPA negotiations taking into account current 
developments and the rise of emerging economies. The new issues (geographical 
indications, investment, Trade and Environment, etc) that are being introduced in the 
negotiations should not be negotiated to ensure the interests of African countries are not 
compromised 
x. The African regions negotiating EPAs and the African Union should continue to 
collectively maintain their positions on the following: Most Favoured Nation (MFN), 
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Export taxes, Safeguards, Rules of Origin, Non-Execution Clause, which are considered 
to be of critical importance to the development aspirations of regions and the continent 
as a whole” (African Union, 2012) 
 
Another case in which Africa has also succeeded to gain more policy space and 
ownership resulted from their common position on development effectiveness and aid 
reform for the Busan 4
th
 High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness setting that set a future 
global aid agenda. Following the Tunis Consensus in 2010 (African Development Bank, 
2010), the African Union organised a meeting in Addis Ababa on 30
th
 of September 
2011 to form the basis of Africa´s negotiating position in Busan. Among the priorities 
agreed in the common position was that “regional economic communities, investments 
and cooperation are an essential aspect of ensuring Africa´s development goals” and 
that the continent needed to reduce the dependence on foreign aid and mobilise and 
support a more diverse development finance base. The Chief Executive Officer of the 
Planning and Coordinating Agency of the New Partnership for Africa´s Development 
(NEPAD), Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, was quoted as saying: “We are taking charge of our 
own destiny. For the first time, Africa has presented its own vision for aid and the future 
of development of the continent.” (NEPAD, 2011) The Busan Declaration by 
highlighting the issue of development effectiveness shows that when African comes 




This paper has explored dimensions of regional integration in Africa and analysed the 
possible sources of limitations or potential of such developments. Regional integration 
at continental level is different from the sub-regional level, and the degree of integration 
is not comparable to that of other instances of regional integration such as the EU or 
even Mercosul. 
Africa is a fragmented political reality and marked by social and cultural diversity. 
However, its countries share the concerns of a continent lagging behind in development, 
with highly impoverished populations lacking access to basic services. In social and 
demographic terms the continent is permeated by ethnic lines and social affinities, 
including economic relations that overcome classical borders. More convergence and 
policy articulation would make sense given the irrationality of existing borders that 
were defined artificially by the colonial powers. 
The Pan-African ideology has roots in post-colonial anti-capitalist ideology, which soon 
after the end of the Cold War gave way to divergences regarding embracing neo-
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liberalism and negotiating trade agreements or resisting that tendency. These are 
reflected for example in the divisions and criticisms that view NEPAD as a neo-liberal 
influence and externally imposed agenda, which was embraced and promoted by a few 
African leaders. 
As this paper has shown there are a number of areas where convergence and 
coordination of policy positions enhance Africa’s influence and capacity to determine 
policy outcomes. Such is the case of the EPAs on the issue of trade relations between 
Africa and EU or Busan on aid effectiveness (now development effectiveness). These 
are strategic areas of interest that go beyond merely ideological assertions more 
ambitious than the existing capacity to implement them. 
The conclusions of this paper also point to the idea of strategic consistency, which 
depends on the identification of clear areas of common salient interest where 
preferences can be made to converge on specific issues. This entails creating an agenda 
that is truly African and that avoids the over-bureaucratic trap of the EU model. This 
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